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Biometric technologies have been under development for years. Finger, face, and iris 
scanners are already in place in both high and low security environments. Over the next 
decade, many companies are preparing to deploy biometric scanners in everything from 
cars and pocketbooks to corporate offices and ATMs. The proliferation of a technology 
that is currently unregulated, non-standardized, and uses questionably secured databases 
to hold unique, non-secret, and irreplaceable personal identifiers - whether fingerprint, 
iris, facial scan, or some other - is a risky proposition. This paper looks at the myriad 
complications and caveats of biometric technology, and should serve to caution anyone, 
especially decision makers and influencers who manage data access and those who may 
consider implementing or authorizing the use of biometrics in their data environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 Advancing technological innovations are using human biological information to 
protect data and data access. Devices built to authenticate or identify an individual based 
upon biological markers are part of a field of science known as biometrics. A person’s 
fingerprint whorls and swirls, their hand and face geometry, their iris and retinal patterns, 
their voice pattern, and even the composition of their sweat are all examples of 
biometrics. In our daily lives, the act of recognizing another individual requires us to 
interpret biometric information. Although the term “biometrics” may lack widespread 
recognition in homes across America, the field’s influence is certain to become nothing 
short of ubiquitous in the coming years. Biometrics of the past and present – even those 
as commonplace as the hand-written signature – are already being enhanced or outright 
replaced by advancing biometric techniques. Yet many of the elements in biometric 
research are relatively unknown to the Information Science community. Still the province 
of Computer and Mathematical Sciences, it is necessary for IS to become more 
acquainted. How appropriately these biometric advancements are applied to securing 
data, their practicality in everyday application, their effectiveness and accuracy, and how 
heavily we rely upon them to protect data are timely issues. There is a great need for 
more study and research before we allow these newer, more personal, and potentially 
invasive biometric technologies to enter our lives, because these technologies carry the 
possibility of becoming so heavily ingrained and accepted in our daily routines that we
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may find ourselves unable to distance ourselves from them.  
 Biometrics could open the proverbial Pandora’s Box. Despite what the sales and 
marketing forces of the manufacturers might have us believe about the security of 
biometric technologies, they are far from perfected. If your fingerprint, your facial image, 
or your retinal pattern are permanently duplicated or even just electronically hijacked for 
a short time, your life could change irrevocably. The possibilities for illicit use of a stolen 
biometric are disturbing, and as companies implement biometric devices with the aims of 
better security for information access, those who manage the equipment must be aware of 
the risks that accompany such implementations. Furthermore, companies must address 
biometric privacy concerns rather than assume tacit consent from employees and 
customers who may not be cognizant of potential risks. Such measures are necessary 
because these proprietary systems appear to be significantly vulnerable to attack. 
 Researchers who intentionally attack and break biometric devices are finding that 
many of them lack sufficient reliability and security against circumvention or theft. 
Unfortunately, much of society seems oblivious to the dangers of freely giving their 
fingerprint or any other biometric. In May 2002, Indivos Corp. put fingerprint scanners in 
a Thriftway in West Seattle, Washington. A reporter from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 
an online newspaper, wrote that the customers “had few concerns about handing over 
their index fingerprint and credit card number to Indivos [1].” The reporter quoted a 
regular customer as saying “I figure they must have perfected it or they wouldn't be doing 
it [1].” The naiveté of this comment, and the likelihood that such beliefs are far too 
common, is cause for concern. In the same news report, Indivos claimed that it would not 
“sell, rent, license, or share personal data [1].” How can the general public trust that this 
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policy will remain in force for a lifetime? Indivos is likely to have those customers on file 
for many years. 
 The issue of biometric ownership is fraught with difficult issues. In the Post-
Intellegencer story, the reporter mentioned that Indivos was suing another grocer’s 
biometric payment processing company, Biometric Access Corporation, for copyright 
infringement. Hypothetically, although Indivos lost the case, Biometric Access 
Corporation could have countersued and won rights to Indivos’ databases. If Indivos 
were divested or merged with another company, that action could adversely affect the 
consumers’ privacy and security. The privacy rights might not remain intact. There might 
not be an opt-out period offered before the data transfer. Since biometrics exist as a 
wholly unregulated industry, lacking a coherent set of standards and authoritative bodies 
to provide oversight, the Thriftway example raises many privacy issues that deserve 
investigation. If you have a grocer’s savings card, you can opt not to use it if you desire 
and you may regain some small amount of anonymity. But once your fingerprint is in use 
by your grocer and in other various stores and settings, across multiple vendors and 
applications, database sharing becomes no small matter. History and logic tell us that 
profit, not privacy, is likely to be more important to the corporations in control of this 
data.
 This study examines the current state of the art in biometric technology research 
and examines its limitations and threats to its security. Biometric devices must contain 
safeguards to prevent the mining of personal data by untrusted sources. Any biometric 
device that scans accurately but holds the potential to disclose personal information about 
any or all subjects through known circumvention techniques, especially without a full 
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disclaimer of such possibilities to said subjects, should immediately raise questions about 
privacy and security.
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BACKGROUND 
 
 Banking and financial systems are arguably some of our nation’s most secure 
systems. Yet, in February 2003, more than 8 million card numbers were stolen from Data 
Processors International, a processor for Visa, MasterCard and American Express [2]. If a 
bank’s, their subsidiary’s or processor’s credit card database servers are illegally accessed 
and card numbers are stolen, the issuing bank can void the numbers, stop transaction 
acceptance on those cards, and notify customers that a replacement card is forthcoming. 
Consider a server full of biometric data. If credit card numbers can be stolen, and 
presumably decrypted, from secured financial institutions, then biometric data is no safer. 
If social security number fraud is difficult to fix once the number is in circulation 
illegally, then an individual will have difficulty convincing the bank that it “wasn’t my 
retinal image” used to withdraw funds or to make a purchase [3]. An important theme in 
this discussion is that the same biological markers that make us unique are also 
irreplaceable; biometrics cannot be “reissued.”   
 Proponents of biometrics argue that the traditional method of security – 
passwords – are easily forgotten or hacked [4]. There is no reason to believe that a 
biometric database would be any less prone to hack or attack than any other computer 
system, specifically due to the fact that encryption technology is the same regardless of 
what object is encrypted [5]. As biometrics gain widespread acceptance, a person’s 
unique biometric information may be stored in multiple databases in multiple locations. 
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Credit card number databases, even at the corporate level, are carefully monitored and 
secured to guard against theft of the information. But consider this situation from an 
August, 2004 Associated Press news release:
 “BJ's Wholesale Club Inc. attracts shoppers to its stores by putting thousands of discounted 
 products under one roof. It wasn't hard to attract cyberthieves either, with databases that amass 
 credit card numbers in huge numbers. The theft earlier this year of thousands of credit card records 
 from the nation's third-largest warehouse club illustrates the potential for massive-scale identity 
 theft whenever so much purchase-enabling information is stored in one place. It also illustrates 
 how difficult the cleanup can be...” “..Philadelphia-based Sovereign Bank covered about 700 
 fraudulent transactions from the BJ's theft and had to reissue 81,000 cards twice, at a cost of about 
 $1 million... [6]” 
 
 Replace the word “credit card” or “card” with the word “biometric” in the above 
situation. Since biometrics cannot be reissued, 81,000 biometrics would be permanently 
compromised. We assume that credit card databases are encrypted and secured with the 
latest technology by companies with years of financial protection experience, and yet the 
example above shows otherwise. It is not likely that biometrics databases share the level 
of robustness held by our society’s best databases, and since our best are occasionally and 
provably violated, it is only logical to acknowledge that we can expect similar results 
with biometric ones. When a single, poorly managed biometric database is breached, it is 
difficult to imagine to whom will we turn for help. Financial institutions may be able to 
offer advice for vendors that show concern about liability. The government may regulate 
the industry after a given number of failures create public outrage. However, the 
unregulated biometric vendors would be forced into handling the situation quickly and 
appropriately only by self interest and perhaps goodwill, because unlike federally insured 
banks, they do not have federal regulations about the way information is handled. Setting 
standards and creating oversight mechanisms may help address such dangers.  
 One relatively weak and often used biometric already suffers from theft – a 
person’s signature. Signatures are often forged, and as a result, our society has learned 
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not to put much trust in the signature by itself. Our institutions have developed 
safeguards, such as notaries and guaranty stamps, to attest that a person actually signed in 
cases where a signature is most important. But the popular press and many manufacturers 
are putting too much faith in biometric technologies – this relatively young technology 
repeatedly receives accolades of how it is the answer to passwords and that it will protect 
our data in the future. In July 2004, CNN.com’s Technology site presented a report 
entitled “Biometrics to keep handbags safe [7].” In November 2003, USA Today asked, 
“Will that be cash, fingerprint, or cellphone [8]?” Recent automobile television ads show 
luxury cars that open and start with the press of a finger. 
 Biometric technology has the potential to make significant changes in the way we 
make data transfers. Consequently, the Information Science community must be prepared 
to help develop the biometric equivalents of bank security to guard our irreplaceable 
personal biometric data. If the field of Information Science is to prepare those who may 
control and provide access to these databases, we should investigate the available 
research, gathering a clear notion of how well the technology works so that we may 
logically debate the issues and create solutions to mitigate the risks before and after these 
devices are implemented.  
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
 The biometric technologies available today are often used for the securing of data 
and information access – either physical, electronic, or both. Within each type of 
biometric – facial, finger, palm or ear geometry scanning; iris or retinal imagery 
scanning; sweat composition measurements; blood DNA matching; etc. – many options 
are available to the consumer, and each biometric type varies in its ability to provide 
accurate results. These recognition inaccuracies are known in biometrics as “false 
positives” and “false negatives,” both of which will be explained in a later section. 
Regardless, all biometric technologies tend to focus on one of three applications – 
authentication prior to access, authorization for access rights, or 1:1 identification of an 
individual [9]. The appropriate usage of an application in a given circumstance is a 
subject of much debate in the biometric field because biometrics do not perform as well 
in identification as they do in authentication [9]. Furthermore, biometric applications 
collect and store unique personal data without proof that the biometric data storage 
methods are secure against proven attacks [10]. 
 The intent of this research is to collect and organize academic and field 
investigations of the biometric technologies available for use in data security 
applications, drawing upon previously published risk assessment studies and published 
field discussions. There are many experienced researchers who have tested existing 
biometric methods and applications, and these researchers have found the technology in 
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varying states of adequacy for data security [5,10,12,15,18,20,26,27]. Thus, the goal is to 
provide an assessment of the risks and liabilities of these biometric applications in order
to add to the growing body of knowledge that recognizes both the potential rewards and 
the caveats of using personal biometric data for identification and authentication.  
 The inherent and potentially unavoidable risks of biometric technologies need to 
be presented to and acknowledged by both academia and the popular press before such 
technologies inevitably gain greater acceptance – possibly to the point of societal 
dependence. As such, the question arises as to whether or not there is enough user data 
protection to justify the risks of biometric implementations, and whether or not the risks 
of theft of biometric data are worth the reward of increased data security and more 
reliable user authentication. While this discussion does not presume nor intend to make a 
decision for society at large, it will hopefully elucidate whether or not the current 
technology is ready for the challenges of reliable biometric implementation.
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ANALYSIS 
 
BIOMETRIC ATTACK METHODS 
 
Falsification Attacks 
“The main advantage of capacitive sensors is that they require a real fingerprint.” 
   -Bergdata Biometrics GmbH, biometrics manufacturer.[11] 
 
 The optical sensors used in some biometric devices, including many fingerprint 
and palm scanners, often accept forged biometrics because they look only at the physical 
details, such as fingerprint ridges. This is because optical sensors view the input as a 
static set of information. One analogy is to think of such a scan as a photograph that is 
mathematically analyzed by the equipment once it is captured. Another popular type of 
sensor – capacitive – measures the electrical resistance of a material and is expected to 
confirm “liveness” in a biometric. Research has shown that these types of testing devices 
are susceptible to both conductive silicone rubber fingers and gelatin mold fingers. 
Gelatin mold fingers are very easy to make. Soft molding plastic is used to take a 
fingerprint impression, and gelatin, which is dissolved in hot water and then cooled, is 
poured into the mold. The result is a highly realistic “gummy” finger [10]. In tests of 
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eleven different commercially available readers, including models by Secugen, Ethentica, 
Sony, Siemens AG, NEC, OMRON, and Compaq, Tsutomu Matsumoto’s lab at 
Yokohama National University in Japan showed that it is a trivial exercise to fool both 
optical and capacitive sensors using a gummy or silicone finger [10]. His group 
succeeded in both the enrollment and the verification of the fake fingers against enrolled 
fake and enrolled live fingers. The success rate of the falsification attack averaged more 
than 80% against all of the devices [10]. 
 During the process of enrollment, the invariant and discriminatory parts of the 
user’s biometric are scanned and encoded as a template [14]. If the sensors do not detect 
an authentic finger, for example, they are purportedly designed to not enroll the 
biometric. Nevertheless, all eleven sensors were fooled repeatedly by Matsumoto’s 
gummy and conductive silicone fingers. Not only did they enroll and verify against their 
own fake template, but also against a real finger’s template [10]. Both breaches are 
condemning, but the threat against the real finger may be a bit more disturbing. If a fake 
finger matches only against its enrolled fake finger, then the criminally intent enrollee 
could only hope to successfully forge and enroll a finger for various malevolent, but 
potentially limited, purposes. Since this fake will not match a real and expected user of 
the system, it may or may not be given access rights, depending on the system and what 
the system is designed to protect. If, however, a fake can be created that matches against 
a real and existing entry, as Matsumoto has shown conclusively, then every user of the 
system becomes a potential target of theft.   
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Replay/Resubmission Attacks 
 Interception and reuse of another’s biometric is known as a replay attack. The 
copied biometric is replayed, or resubmitted, as if the person were still present. Replay is 
similar to a falsification attack because the submission is a forgery, but it differs in that 
the biometric is strictly pre-existing on the system; it requires an enrolled subject. A 
replay attack uses various methods to resubmit the biometric in an attempt to gain access. 
For biometric devices that use capacitance as a security measure, one simple method that 
has been employed with moderate success is to blow humid air on the device. With this 
method, the fat deposits of the last latent image are reactivated and create just enough 
electrical current to fool the sensor [12]. 
 After the German Federal Institute for Information Technology Security and the 
Fraunhofer Research Institute refused to publish the results of extensive security testing 
on several biometric device manufacturers, c’t, a German computer trade periodical in 
publication for over twenty years, decided to test biometric devices and publish the 
results. A majority of devices readily available for biometric security are fingerprint 
scanners [12, 13]. Face and iris scanners battle for second and third in the market [12]. 
Since all other biometric types combined make up less of the market than these three, c’t 
decide to test eleven total biometrics from the first three categories [12]. Among six 
capacitive fingerprint scanners from Biocentric Solutions, Cherry, Eutron, Siemens, and 
Veridicom, two optical fingerprint scanners from Cherry and Identix, and one thermal 
fingerprint scanner from IdentAlink, c’t found many flaws [12].  
 After experiencing marginal success rates with the warm air blowing technique, 
c’t researchers used bags of water to apply even pressure to the latent fingerprints on the 
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device. This technique worked intermittently, but often enough to raise concerns:  
 “The probable reason for this phenomenon [is] that the capacitors of the capacitive sensor are 
sensitive to humidity. Damp air that, for instance, condenses on the sensor's surface where there 
are residues of fat causes the relative dielectric constant on the sensor's surface to change thus 
leading to a change in capacitance which the device interprets as a release signal inducing it to 
undertake a measurement [12].” 
 
One sensor showed particular susceptibility to the water-filled balloon method. Once the 
sensor was dusted with graphite powder, and after the visible fatty residue was covered 
with adhesive film, pressure was applied using the balloon to achieve a near 100 percent 
success rate [12].  
 Iris scanners and facial recognition scanners are also susceptible to attacks. In 
other tests, c’t researchers took photographs of eyes enrolled in the system and used an 
inkjet printer to produce photographic quality printouts of them. Once the scanner’s 
method of detecting liveness was determined – eye depth in this case – the researchers 
found a novel approach to circumvent the test. Unable to get the scanner to accept an 
image of an eye as real, they cut out and removed the pupil from the printout, then put 
their own eyes behind the image and thereby fooled the iris scanner [12]. Facial 
recognition scanners fell to c’t researchers with hand held photographs and replayed AVI 
video clips that showed a few seconds of a head turning [12]. 
 In fairness, c’t mentions that the device manufacturers of their tested products 
state that the devices are not for use in high security environments. Several of the devices 
are merely mouse or keyboard sensors, which are likely sold as much for the novelty and 
public fascination as for security. Nevertheless, ubiquitous biometric devices will not all 
be used in high security environments, yet they should still be expected to perform 
appropriately if their job is to protect access. The novel application of such biometric 
scanners is disconcerting because it creates both a false sense of security and markets the 
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low-end devices as somehow more useful than a password, despite the exposed flaws of 
the former. Because biometric devices are available with varying degrees of quality, 
individual consumers and companies may not be able to find out which ones to trust 
without ongoing, independent testing.
 
 
Man in the Middle/Channel Attacks 
 As with man in the middle (MITM) attacks on networks, if someone can 
eavesdrop on the conversation, they have effectively breached security. In biometrics, 
MITM attacks are sometimes referred to as channel attacks. If a device can be attached to 
a biometric scanner and listen to the channel during the enrollment phase, a biometric 
could not only be intercepted, but the device’s response to enrollment may allow other 
clues towards penetration of the system. The pervasive use of scanners in public and 
private realms will make MITM attacks possible. Compounding the issue, interception of 
a biometric with a channel attack could create the opportunity for replay, falsification, 
and hill-climbing attacks on the devices.  
 
 
Hill-Climbing Attacks 
 As previously stated, users are added to a biometric database through the process 
known as enrollment, at which point a template is created. When a user presents a 
biometric for verification, a value is calculated between the submitted features of the user 
and the user’s stored template in a process known as matching [14]. The biometric 
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program processes the data and returns that value as a score [14]. A skilled MITM 
attacker who is capable of gaining access to a user’s template and who is able to 
introduce a rogue application – one which captures the score and submits biometric data 
– can defeat the system using a hill-climbing attack [14, 15]. With a fingerprint system, 
for example, such an attack would be performed by a pairing and submitting a random 
fingerprint with the user’s template [14]. The attacker submits multiple samples and 
merges those that create a positive score, eventually fooling the device and gaining access 
[15]. The BioAPI Consortium [16] has recommended that the template scores be 
quantized, which means that small changes to the image will not affect the score enough 
to be useful in a hill-climbing attack. Nevertheless, Adler [15] was able to achieve a 
95%CI with a hill-climbing attack against a system that used the consortium’s 
recommended quantization.  
  All of the attacks discussed so far have some similarities that may blur what 
distinguishes hill-climbing from them. Hill-climbing may be considered a variation of the 
MITM attack, but it is not a replay attack because the submission is uniquely created for 
each attempt at access. Since the submission requires an existing template, hill-climbing 
is also not a falsification attack as previously defined, but it could be argued that it is a 
subclass.
 
 
Decision Override Attacks 
 Decision override attacks are another class of attack. This type requires 
substantial access to a biometric device’s decision making processes. If the matcher 
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application and the database do not reside in a secure location, the ability of an attacker to 
alter the final result, or decision, of the biometric device is a theoretical possibility [17]. 
This issue is open to further research.  
 
  
Forced Action Attacks 
 Forced action attacks occur when a person is put under duress to elicit biometric 
presentation. For example, a criminal may force a person to use her biometric at gunpoint 
in order to gain illicit access. Another example would be that a user is drugged or 
rendered unconscious and the biometric is used thusly. These types of attacks are not 
against the system as much as the person, which makes them all the more dangerous as a 
possible threat [10].  
 If biometric devices come to protect a myriad of valuable goods, there will exist a 
greater incentive for criminals to harm people for access to those goods. If such devices 
allow us access to a bank’s ATM at the scan of an eye or touch of a finger, then the same 
criminal that once had to locate a person with a bank card and force him to operate the 
machine no longer has to linger around an ATM just to find someone with a bank card to 
attack. The act of obtaining the “key” can now be planned miles away in any less secure 
environment. Thus, an affluent person in expensive clothing may bear additional risk 
when a criminal is looking for a hand or a head to force against a scanner.
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OTHER BIOMETRIC ISSUES 
 
False Positives and False Negatives, Acceptance and Accuracy, and Usability 
 Fault tolerance limits pose a weighty challenge to biometric technologies and are 
a confusing subject to both the layman and the well informed. Biometrics devices must 
not only validate the authentic submissions but also reject the equivocal ones. If the 
system fails to do one or the other, it is not useful as a security device. An issue that 
biometrics vendors must deal with is the need to tweak false rates of both rejection and 
acceptance. A false rejection is interchangeably referred to as a false negative; both 
meaning the rejection is wrong – there should have been an acceptance. In similar 
fashion, a false acceptance is also referred to as a false positive; meaning the acceptance 
is wrong – there should have been a rejection. The vendor wants to minimize both of 
these error rates as much as possible. Of critical importance is the ability to fail 
gracefully; it is better to falsely reject and inconvenience someone than to falsely accept 
them and risk a security breach.  
 Further complicating the issue is that the false rejection and false acceptance rates 
are subsets of the overall acceptance (or verification) rate – a rate which can be viewed in 
two different ways: the vendor’s overall acceptance rate, which is determined by the 
vendor’s adjustments to the hardware and software; and the “real world” or “actual” 
overall acceptance rate, which is based upon what happens mathematically when the 
system is actively challenged to authenticate and reject users. In order to understand 
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overall acceptance rates, we must separately consider the physical limitations of the 
system against the mistakes of the hardware and software.  
 After a given number of subjects are put through a system, an overall acceptance 
rate is calculated as a percentage. If nine users are let in out of ten, then the “actual” 
overall acceptance rate is 90%. However, this is just the rate of authentication based upon 
how many users made it through the system. This “actual” overall acceptance rate is not 
useful for determining effectiveness of a system without another piece of information.   
 The important value to determine is how many of the 90% accepted were valid 
user claims; in other words, how many of those nine should have been let through. If the 
number of valid user claims against the system is not known, the effectiveness of the 
system is indeterminate. After all, if 100% of the claims were valid, then 90% is a poor 
statistic. If, however, 90% of the claims were valid and 10% were falsifications, the 
statistic is ideal; it is the golden mark that manufacturers and vendors have a great deal of 
difficulty hitting – and with good reason. 
 One reason the acceptance issue is obtuse is because in the example, the 90% 
“actual” overall acceptance rate is the best the hardware and software can do in a real 
world situation; the hardware and software combined can perform no better than 90% 
acceptance. As such, this 90% acceptance rate translates as the manufacturer’s 100% 
setting for the device. The situation of hardware and software limitations make the 
accuracy rate data confusing, which leaves an opening for vendors to state misleading 
facts without actually making false statements. For example, even though the 
aforementioned device cannot attain a 100% accuracy in the real world, it can perhaps 
attain 95% of the hardware’s 100% – which we know from our hypothetical testing is 
 
  21 
90%. So if the vendor states that the device has a 95% accuracy rate, even though 95% of 
90% is only 85.5%, the statement is disingenuous without being false. Therefore, how 
this number is derived is always crucial in judging a manufacturer’s claims, because a 
95% accuracy rate for a device that can only attain an actual 60% is a device that has a 
effective accuracy rate of 57%. And since this derivation is from the maximum setting 
that the example device can achieve, scanning percentages can only go down when the 
vendor adjusts for too many false positives or false negatives.   
 A manufacturer will adjust the overall acceptance rate based upon how 
aggressively and appropriately they desire the false positives and false negatives to be 
handled by the software and hardware. Figure 1. shows the decision process of the 
biometric system. A manufacturer can ease the restrictions on what defines a match; 
fewer points of comparison, larger allowances for physical variations, greater tolerance 
for partial matches, broading the scoring calculation range used to determine acceptance, 
etc. Theoretically, even if a vendor were to set the system to accept 100% of the 
submissions which make the even a slight or partial match to any template in the system, 
there will be problems with legitimate users. Since the “actual” overall acceptance rate is 
known to reach only 90% in the example, the device will be incapable of matching ten 
users out of one hundred in the system. Some of those failures will be legitimate users; 
perhaps because the biometric is injured or changed, the sensor is dirty, or because the 
user’s template is of poor quality. If no match is made by a system that is set to 100% 
acceptance, the user is still rejected, whether she is a valid user or not.  
 In this example, the real world accuracy rate will be marginal and security 
nonexistent because anyone who is successfully scanned – anyone in the (real world
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delimited) 90% acceptance rate – and anyone whose scan matches the slightest portion of 
a template will be verified. However, the vendor’s effective 90% acceptance rate sounds 
good to clients, and most users will not have to suffer through multiple scans or false 
rejection. 
 
 
Figure 1. scan process tree 
 
 Next, false rejection and false acceptance are affected by adusting the system. In 
Figure 2., assume a vendor believes that he has achieved optimal performance and has 
these percentages after testing and adjusting the system. Although the false accept and 
reject rates are a mere 1%, assume that the vendor’s client wants to further reduce false 
rejections. In this situation, the vendor can adjust the system by setting a higher initial 
acceptance, as shown in Figure 3. However, the situation has not really improved. 
Because the system is reducing the required score for a match or relaxing some other 
requirement, a match is now 4% more likely to occur on a given dataset. The false reject 
rate goes down and more users gain access. The false rejection rate drops to a client 
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acceptable .5%. However, the 1% false accept rate is now 5%. In other words, another 
4% of the access to the secured area or data is inappropriate. Such a tradeoff is an 
unacceptable solution. 
 
 
Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. 
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 In response to the rise in false accepts, the vendor scurries to adjust for the new 
flaw because the client insists on as little false acceptance as possible. As shown in 
Figure 4., the scales have now tipped the other way. Now, one hundredth of a percent of 
the validation process is granting inappropriate access. But mathematically, in order to 
accomplish this, 15% of users that should be accepted have to be rejected as well. 
 
 
Figure 4. 
 
 The above example is one way that vendors can adjust their systems, but it reveals 
the critical flaw in the technology – once a combination of hardware and software yields 
a measured ability to handle input, that input can only be loosened or tightened, and one 
side of the equation suffers. It becomes a zero sum situation. As the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) points out in their publication, Standards for 
Biometric Accuracy, Tamper Resistance, and Interoperability, “there is a trade-off 
between these two tasks, and one cannot simultaneously maximize the performance of 
both tasks [18].” In light of this, manufacturer accuracy rates may not be trustworthy. 
Vendors have a monetary incentive to adjust and to report statistics to their advantage. 
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Ideal rates are often achievable only under the manufacturer’s optimal laboratory 
conditions, which may be a clean room with perfect lighting and very clean submissions; 
lighting, dust particles, skin oils, skin and air moisture levels, ambient temperature, noisy 
sensor data, and many other variables all affect scans [19]. A “bad” scan can happen even 
at a theoretical 99% accuracy rate. Optimal conditions do not exist, and since vendors can 
skew the results in their favor, anyone considering the implementation of a biometric 
scanning system must investigate diligently what happens in a production environment.  
 
  
Scalability 
 One of the greatest advantages of biometrics is that they are almost entirely 
unique. They are not completely unique, however. Although unlikely that two individuals 
with identical fingerprints would end up accessing the same system, conventional 
wisdom is flawed when it assumes that fingerprints are 100% unique. No statistical 
evidence exists to prove that all fingerprints are unique [20]. There is current 
disagreement among experts regarding the number of minutiae, or points of match, that 
are sufficient to make a positive match with certainty. One problem is that the federal and 
state databases that hold fingerprints are vast and growing rapidly [20]. In 2003, an 
American lawyer was arrested for a crime committed by an Algerian because their 
fingerprints had 15 points of match in common [20]. Eight points of match are used 
regularly to convict the accused, and the FBI is on record stating that the evidence in this 
case was “absolutely incontrovertible [20]”.  
 So, although only very small probability exists that someone may eventually scan 
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as someone else if biometric scanners do not score enough minutiae, it leads to a larger 
point. Fingerprinting, a biometric system trusted for decades and believed to be 
foolproof, is preparing to break new ground with statistical research for validation or 
refute [20]. Simultaneously, new technology that relies upon the uniqueness of 
fingerprints has arrived with claims that it solves security problems. According to 
University of Virginia law professor and Harvard University visiting Professor, Jennifer 
Mnookin [20], there is no consensus about how many points of match can definitively 
determine a match. If Mnookin’s claim is true, biometric device manufacturers, who must 
use either existing match scales or ones of their own creation, are unrealistic in any 
expectation of manufacturing products which are statistically accurate on very large 
scales. A NIST study concluded that a database of 40 million people would require four 
fingers to make a match without finding duplicates [18].  
 Success rates in matching ability vary greatly from device to device. NIST 
concluded that for a “database size of 1000 subjects, the rank one identification accuracy 
of a single finger is 93% while the rank one identification accuracy for a face is 83% 
[18].” The NIST summary defines “rank one” as the match that scores the highest score 
after the entire database is scored against a particular entry. The NIST study also notes a 
1% chance of false acceptance for a database of 6000 fingers or 3000 faces. Both 
estimates assume optimal lighting conditions. In another study, NIST found that 
verification performance – just recognizing the face at all – drops from 95% indoors to 
54% with outdoor lighting for the best facial recognition system [21]. The low accuracy 
rating means frustration for users, because they will be falsely rejected by the system. 
Biometric technology will undoubtedly improve over time. At this point, however, large 
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scale biometric databases are technologically infeasible.
 
 
Identification versus Authentication 
 There exists a subtle but important distinction between identification and  
authentication (sometimes referred to as verification). Identification is a process of 
matching an individual against an entire database for a given purpose, without the 
necessity of an identity claim by the individual [22]. Identification asks the question: who 
are you? Authentication is a one-to-one matching process, where who someone claims to 
be is matched against a single record in a database [22]. Authentication asks: are you who 
you say you are? In the situation of a computer login, the username is the identification 
and the password is the authentication. When using a biometric scanner, the username 
and password are combined as a single entity, which is both an advantage and a danger of 
biometric systems. An important question that arises is whether or not combining 
identification and authentication is an improvement in security. A benefit of biomtric 
technology is that it is possible to authenticate a biometric against a database without ever 
identifying the person. Think of a fingerprint as a password that is assumed so unique that 
it provides access based solely on the approval of that biometric “password” with no 
“username” required. The tradeoff is that the username and password (or identifier and 
authenticator) are permanently tied together, which means that linking the identifier to 
the authenticator could be done without the knowledge of the person who supplied it. 
This problem is certain to generate privacy concerns in the future because if the system 
owner desires, this action can be done at any point in time after the biometric is collected.  
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Temporal Nature 
 Biometrics have a temporal quality that is regularly discussed in publications. 
Aging and growth cause our skin texture and placement to shift. Furthermore, damage to 
the dermis can alter the presentation of skin-based biometrics [23]. This creates a 
problem that will become a bigger issue as the technology pervades. Sensor designs must 
either adjust for age, possibly increasing false positives in the process, or re-enrollment 
may be required every few years. The NIST Face Recognition Vendor Test 2002 found 
that even the top three tested systems identified 18 to 22 year olds 12% less reliably than 
38 to 42 year olds, at 62% and 74%, respectively [21].
 
 
Irreplaceability 
 The irreplaceability of biometrics is perhaps the biggest roadblock to their 
widespread adoption. As previously noted, no one can reissue a biometric should it be 
stolen or copied. This is a fundamental point that detracts from the position of anyone 
who argues that giving a biometric scan is no different than giving your social security 
number. Besides the fact that a SSN is revealed selectively and with relative caution by 
most knowledgeable persons, if it is stolen, it is still possible (albeit difficult) to get a 
replacement. Security precautions exist for the protection of SSNs. For example, watch 
lists at credit agencies detect new accounts being opened using pilfered SSNs. In contrast, 
biometrics companies have no known security precautions or agencies to protect this 
irreplaceable commodity.
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DEFEATING ATTACKS 
 
 Development and testing standards should be created to assist in the deterrence of 
many of the attack methods discussed. Although one manufacturer may block one attack 
effectively, another may not. Open standards would create an opportunity for 
manufacturers to contribute to the improvement of all similar devices. However, open 
standards are often not embraced by corporations because of the perceived notion that 
they can work against a company that wants to set itself apart as a market leader who 
manufactures a superior product. On the other hand, proprietary industry standards would 
require a standards body. This arrangement has its own set of issues to consider but are 
beyond the scope of this discussion. Nevertheless, if manufacturers in industries that deal 
with government regulations and industry standards for things such as electronic 
equipment, material usage and handling, etc., can find ways to create a body of standards 
with a governing body to provide oversight, there is no reason why biometric 
technologies should be any different. Adherence to open standards or having a governing 
body to provide oversight would make using biometric technologies safer for all.  
 Jain and Ulidag [24] suggest that encryption, watermarking, and steganography 
could be used to protect against biometric attacks. Specifically, they suggest that data 
could be transmitted securely by hiding it in the electronic carrier between the scanner 
and the template-matching algorithms. Man in the middle attacks would then be rendered 
much more difficult to perpetrate, provided that an individual who successfully intercepts 
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the transmission is unable to break the encryption scheme. The relative level of difficulty 
between interception and encryption breaking is substantial – enough to warrant further 
investigation into this method.  
 To further thwart the MITM threat, Ratha et al.[25] suggest a challenge/response 
system that requires an intelligent sensor to perform some mathematical task on a 
biometric scan which is then replicated at the backend. These challenge/response 
calculations must match on both ends and would theoretically remove the likelihood of a 
MITM insertion.
 Hill-climbing attacks may be prevented by allowing a limited number of 
sequential attempts that do not produce a positive match [14]. Although this defensive 
technique has been defeated, the BioAPI Consortium still recommends such quantizing of 
the score for increased security against hill-climbing [15, 16]. Soutar [14] suggests 
“forced mutual authentication” between the device application and the backend system or 
through a third party verification component. The theory behind this type of 
authentication is that by forcing the device application and backend to recognize and to 
acknowledge each another in some way, another barrier is created against forgery. 
 Van der Putte and Keuning [26] discuss the possibility that heartbeat or blood 
pressure measurements could deter replay attacks, but they are ambivalent as to the 
feasibility of such measures. No existing liveness tests are undefeatable, and the 
technology to detect a replay attack is severely lacking [13]. Since replay attacks are such 
a simple attack type to replicate, finding a way to deter them is a critical area for future 
development and research.  
 There are no countermeasures for forced action attacks beyond typical self-
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defense and protection strategies such as awareness of personal surroundings, daylight, 
crowds, knowing a martial art, etc. The problem, as Schneier [9] points out, is that “while 
a biometric might be a unique identifier, it is not a secret.” Other researchers agree that 
the lack of secrecy is a serious problem [27]; our biometrics are not even well hidden. 
Credit cards and valuables can be left at home or hidden, but our fingers, eyes, and hand 
geometry are always in a known location and in plain view, tempting a would-be thief. 
Furthermore, fingerprints, DNA, and sweat are residual – they can be collected long after 
someone has left an area. The risk of biometric removal, forced presentation, latent theft 
and forgery are all dangerous problems that must be addressed. 
 Schneier [5] recommends the use of a PIN or password coupled with the 
biometric device. Such a solution would resolve the authentication versus identification 
issues, but the pairing of a password or PIN with a biometric, as many implementations 
do, is less that ideal because it does not absolve the user from the need to recall 
something. Thus, it does not necessarily make things easier when compared to traditional 
username and password systems. If people come to believe that the biometrics alone 
provide a secure solution, they will reject the reduction in user friendliness that additions 
such as passwords or PINs necessitate. 
 Another potential attack countermeasure is under current investigation. “Soft 
biometric” traits, such as gender, height, weight, hair, eye, or skin color, have shown to 
improve fingerprint scanner performance by up to 6% [19]. It is possible that such 
research will result in new and more secure biometric devices. 
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DISCUSSION OF BIOMETRICS OUTLOOK 
 
 There are many uses for biometrics, and one potential application that has made 
substantial headlines since the 9/11 attacks is using them to reduce identity theft because 
they purportedly guarantee identity. In the long term, there are certain to be 
complications and caveats that were not envisioned. It is possible that widespread use of 
an unregulated technology may actually enable a type of identity theft that is 
immeasurably more difficult to deter and to resolve as compared to today’s identity theft 
cases. For example, it will be difficult for someone to argue that their 
face/finger/palm/retina was not used to open an account that was validated by a 
biometric. Add a social security number and a mother’s maiden name to the biometric 
theft, and there is little recourse against a thief’s actions. 
 As of July 2004, if a US citizen is willing to give the U.S. Government a copy of 
his iris and fingerprint, and upon clearing a background and terrorist watch list check, 
that individual will receive a Registered Traveler card from the Transportation Security 
Administration [28]. This federal program, still in testing, allows a passenger faster 
movement through security checks at an airport via an automated kiosk. Not only is the 
government’s trust in biometrics very high in this program, but the people using the 
program are voluntarily providing the U.S. Government access to their iris scan and 
fingerprints for life. 
 Biometric standards are struggling to acheive broader support. Three 
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specifications exist that are worthy of note. The BioAPI Consortium, which includes 
members such as Intel and HP (but not Microsoft or IBM) has created the BioAPI 
specification, which has remained without update at version 1.1 since March 2001. No 
current or future scheduled meetings were listed on the bioapi.org website as of 11/02/04. 
 NIST and the Biometric Consortium, under partial sponsorship from the National 
Security Agency, developed The Common Biometric Exchange File Format (CBEFF), 
which standardizes a file format to facilitate the “exchange and interoperability of 
biometric data [29]”. This appears to be one of the more promising standards, although 
their is little evidence of an ongoing evolution of the standard.  
 The X9F4 working group is working to restrict access to biometric templates [30]. 
One of the standards to restrict that access, ANSI X9.84, failed to become an ISO 
standard after fast-track submission in 2001 [31]. The current status of this standard is 
unknown, but as with CBEFF, there is little evidence of an ongoing evolution. 
 There are several other industry-specific and industry-related standards groups 
and trade associations, including the International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA), 
the M1 technical committee, the InterNational Committee for Information Technology 
Standards, and those mentioned previously such as the Biometric Consortium, the 
BioAPI Consortium, NIST, the ISO, and ANSI. Nevertheless, regulatory standards 
bodies specific to the growing biometrics industry do not presently exist to provide 
oversight of the technology.   
 Biometric technologies should not necessarily be condemned just because they 
carry risks. Current authentication methods are inherently problematic. Most people 
occasionally forget one or more of their passwords, do not rotate their passwords often or 
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at all, use simple passwords, or are in danger of social engineering exploits. Reliance on 
biometrics to solve password woes is not currently a viable solution when so many 
problems and potential threats exist with their use.  
 Biometric technology solutions have emerged from rational minds searching for 
solutions to the problems of current data protection measures. Although biometrics have 
been around in various forms since the dawn of mankind, the current technological form 
is nascent. Rational consideration must be given to the long-term security and privacy 
issues created when biometrics are used. As information professionals, we must not allow 
a giddy consumer interest or a “wow effect” to override our responsibility to inform and 
to educate. If, as a community, we allow biometric ubiquity without profound and 
outspoken consideration of these issues and risks, we do a disservice to our fellow 
citizens, our progeny, and ourselves. 
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